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  Horowitz Report Chapter 7 Section I

      I. FISA Renewal Application No. 1 (January 12, 2017)
      see https://www.justice.gov/storage/120919-examination.pdf
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CHAPTER SEVEN

THE THREE RENEWAL APPLICATIONS FOR CONTINUED FISA AUTHORITYON CARTER PAGE

In this chapter, we describe the three FISA renewal applications to continue surveillance- targeting Carter Page between January 13, 2017, when the FISA authority granted by the first FISA orders expired, and September 22, 2017, when the last renewal 's authority expired. As described in Chapter Two, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court( FISC) may approve FISA surveillance and physical searches targeting a U.S. person for a period of up to 90 days, subject to renewal, if the government 's FISA application establishes probable cause to conclude that the targeted individual is an agent of a foreign power. A renewal permits the government to continue FISA authority targeting a U.S. person for an additional 90 days if the facts of the investigation continue to support a finding that there is probable cause to believe the targeted individual is an agent of a foreign power.

The process to renew FISA authority, including who reviews and approves the renewal application, is the same process as with an initial application, which we described in Chapters Two and Five. When conducting the Woods Procedures for a renewal, the agent conducting the accuracy review must re-verify that factual assertions repeated from the prior FISA application remain true and must obtain supporting documentation for any new factual assertions. The National Security Division 's( NSD) Office of Intelligence( 01) relies upon the FBI to accurately update the prior FISA application and conduct the accuracy review to determine whether factual information carried over from the prior FISA application remains true.

We describe in this chapter the facts asserted in the three renewal applications submitted to the FISC to demonstrate probable cause that Carter Page was an agent of a foreign power, including new information the FBI intercepted and collected during surveillance of Page. We also describe other factual assertions added to or modified in the renewal applications for the court 's consideration. Finally, we discuss the completion of the Woods Procedures, including who reviewed, certified, and approved each of the three renewal applications, and the court 's final orders. As we describe in Chapter Eight, we found instances in which factual representations made in the three Carter Page renewal applications were inaccurate, incomplete, or unsupported by appropriate documentation, based upon information in the FBI 's possession at the time the applications were filed.

I. FISA Renewal Application No. 1( January 12, 2017)

On January 12, 2017, a day before the initial FISA authority targeting Carter Page was set to expire, and at the request of the FBI, the Department filed an application with the FISC requesting an additional 90 days of FISA coverage targeting Carter Page. A FISC judge reviewed orders resulting in an additional 90 days of surveillance-- targeting Carter Page from January 13, 2017 to April 7, 2017.

A. Investigative Developments and Decision to Seek Renewal

Emails and other communications reflect that in the first week of surveillance on Carter Page following the granting of the first FISA application in October 2016, the Crossfire Hurricane team collected. Based on our review of the Woods Files and communications between the FBI and 01, we identified a few emails between Page and members of the Donald J. Trump for President Campaign concerning campaign related matters. Emails between Supervisory Special Agent 1( SSA 1) and Case Agent 1 show that during the initial weeks of FISA surveillance, they discussed several the believed were significant, including references to. The analysts and agents who reviewed the FISA prepared a

packet that they believed demonstrated Carter Page 's contacts with and references to Russia or Russian officials for QI to consider for a renewal application.

In addition to reviewing the FISA collection, the team continued its efforts( described in Chapter Six) to assess the accuracy of the information in Steele 's election reports. According to the Supervisory Intelligence Analyst( Supervisory Intel Analyst), the team had not corroborated the reporting concerning Carter Page 's activities by the time of Renewal Application No. 1( or subsequent renewal applications), other than confirming Carter Page 's travel to Russia in July 2016.

As detailed in Chapter Six, in November 2016, the FBI closed Steele as a Confidential Human Source( CHS) for his disclosures to Mother Jones concerning his election reports and relationship with the FBI. FBI officials told us that after these disclosures, they continued to assess that Steele was reliable. They said that they viewed the Mother Jones disclosure as a" control'' issue, based on their understanding that it was a reaction to the letter then FBI Director James Comey sent to Congress in late October about the Clinton email investigation. Then Deputy Director Andrew McCabe recalled that Steele 's disclosure to Mother Jones was viewed by the Crossfire Hurricane team as a control issue rather than a reliability issue, and the team was comfortable going forward with seeking a FISA renewal targeting Carter Page. SSA 1 told us that he believed the reason Steele provided for his disclosure to Mother Jones" politicized'' Steele and identified an agenda. SSA 1 said that after Steele 's disclosure to Mother Jones, he thought the team needed to have an independent validation review completed, which we discussed in Chapter Six.

However, to further assess Steele 's reliability, as described in Chapters Six and Eight, senior Counterintelligence Division( CD) officials met with persons with direct knowledge of Steele 's work-related performance in a prior position in midNovember 2016, and told us that they were reassured by the fact that the former employer said that Steele had no history of fabricating, embellishing, or otherwise" spinning'' information in his reporting. In addition, FBI officials told us that they were reassured by statements from Department attorney Bruce Ohr( described in Chapters Eight and Nine) that Ohr believed Steele was never untruthful in his reporting.

Case Agent l 's handwritten notes from a December 2016 Crossfire Hurricane team meeting reflect that the team discussed the information about Steele 's prior work-related performance and Ohr and decided that they" can continue to rely on reporting for FISA.'' Case Agent 1 told us he did not recall this discussion or who said that they could continue to rely on Steele 's reporting in the next FISA application.

Before this team meeting, and around 45 days prior to the expiration of the first FISA authority, Case Agent 1 notified the FBI 's Office of the General Counsel( OGC) and OI that the Crossfire Hurricane team was interested in an additional 90 days of FISA authority targeting Carter Page. Case Agent 1 told us that the Crossfire Hurricane team sought a renewal to determine whether Carter Page had ongoing contact with Russia beyond the 90-day period covered by the first FISA orders. Case Agent 1 said that while it is not automatic to seek a renewal after a first application, there is an" understanding'' that the FBI will typically seek a renewal because at the time they are required to notify OI, they have only had 45 days of surveillance, which is usually not sufficient time to gather enough information, or review the information collected, to determine whether or not there is evidence to continue the investigation. Case Agent 1 told us that the team had not reviewed all of the emails the first FISA application yielded and believed there were additional emails not yet collected. The OGC Unit Chief told us that unless there is no evidence collected with an initial FISA application, the FBI will usually seek a renewal to obtain more information.

B. Preparation and Approval of Renewal Application No. 1 1. Draft Renewal Application

Similar to the first Carter Page FISA application, Case Agent 1 and the OGC Attorney assisted the OI Attorney with the preparation of Renewal Application No. 1. However, the OGC Attorney told us that he was less involved in the preparation of this application as compared to the first application, which he said was typical of OGC involvement in renewal applications. Emails between 01, the OGC Attorney, and Case Agent 1 following the FISC 's approval of the first FISA application on October 21, 2016, reflect that Case Agent 1 provided updates to 01 on relevant FISA collections and case activities in the Carter Page investigation throughout the fall. The 01 Attorney reviewed this information for inclusion into a renewal application and began drafting Renewal Application No. 1 in December. The 01 Attorney told the OIG that, when drafting a renewal application, he relies on the FBI to provide him information relevant to the ongoing investigation, including any new information that may contradict or may be different from information presented to the FISC in prior FISA applications.

NSD officials told us that the drafting of Renewal Application No. 1 followed the same process and received the same level of scrutiny as the first FISA application signed in October, but because OI 's questions about Steele and his election reporting were addressed in the first application, there were fewer discussions about the renewal application, as compared to the first application, and Renewal Application No. 1 was completed in less time. By December 28, 2016, the 01 Attorney had completed a draft of Renewal Application No. 1, described below, and selected relevant FISA intercepts and results of the ongoing investigation to incorporate in the draft.

As in the first FISA application, the statement of facts in support of probable cause for the renewal stated that the Russians attempted to undermine and influence the 2016 presidential election, and that the FBI believed Carter Page was acting in conjunction with the Russians in those efforts. The statement of facts supported this assessment with the five main elements enumerated in the first application( described in Chapter Five) and added recent investigative results. Specifically, the elements that carried over from the first FISA application were:

( 1) The efforts of Russian Intelligence Services( RIS) to influence the 2016 presidential election-the renewal application stated that although the elections had concluded, the FBI believed that the Russian government would continue efforts to use U.S. persons, such as Carter Page, to covertly influence U.S. foreign policy and support Russia 's perception management efforts;

( 2) The Russian government 's attempted coordination with members of the Trump campaign, which was based on the Friendly Foreign Government( FFG) information concerning the offer or suggestion of assistance from the Russians to someone associated with the Trump campaign.

( 3) Carter Page 's historical connections to Russia and RIS, which included his business dealings with the Russian energy company Gazprom, his relationships with known Russian intelligence officers, and his disclosure to the FBI and a Russian Minister that he was Male-1 in an indictment against Russian intelligence officers;

( 4) Carter Page 's alleged coordination with the Russian government in 2016 U.S. presidential election activities, based on some of the reporting from Steele; and 200

( 5) Carter Page 's continued connections to Russian officials, based on the FBl 's assessment of a consensually monitored October 17, 2016 conversation between Page and an FBI CHS.

In addition, the recent investigative results section of the application included references to the following:

โ€ข In December 2016, Carter Page made statements to an FBI CHS( summarized in Chapter Ten), distancing himself from his October suggestion of establishing a Russian-funded think tank, citing funding issues as a reason, which the FBI assessed was an indication that Page was likely trying to distance himself from Russia as a result of media reporting that continued to tie Page to Russia.

The renewal application stated that the FBI believed the recent investigative results demonstrated that Carter Page continued to try to influence U.S. foreign policy on behalf of Russia. The renewal application, like the first FISA application, failed to include information provided to the FBI by another U.S. government agency in August 2016 that Carter Page had a prior relationship with that other agency and had provided information to the other agency.

Renewal Application No. 1 included the same information from Steele 's reporting that appeared in the first FISA application. However, the renewal application advised the court of Steele 's disclosure to Mother Jones and that the FBI had" suspended'' its relationship with Steele. Specifically, the source characterization statement for Steele in the renewal application stated the following:

As discussed below in footnote 19, in or about October 2016, the FBI suspended its relationship with[ Steele] due to[ Steele 's] unauthorized disclosure of information to the press. Notwithstanding the suspension of its relationship with[ Steele], the FBI assesses[ Steele] to be reliable as previous reporting from[ Steele] has been corroborated and used in criminal proceedings. Moreover, the FBI notes that the incident that led to the FBI suspending its relationship with[ Steele] occurred after[ Steele] provided the reporting that is described herein.( Emphasis in original).

Later in the renewal application, footnote 19 referenced both the Yahoo News article, with the unsupported language from the first FISA application unchanged, and the Mother Jones article, and stated:

As discussed above,[ Steele] was hired by a business associate to conduct research into Candidate# l 's ties to Russia.[ Steele] provided the results of his research to the business associate, and the FBI assesses that the business associate likely provided this information to the law firm that hired the business associate in the first place.[ Steele] told the FBI that he/she only provided this information to the business associate and the FBI. Given that the information contained in the September 23rd News Article generally matches the information about Page that[ Steele] discovered during his/her research, the FBI assesses that[ Steele 's] business associate or the law firm that hired the business associate likely provided this information to the press. The FBI also assesses that whoever gave the information to the press stated that the information was provided by a" well-placed Western intelligence source.'' The FBI does not believe that( Steele] directly provided this information to the identified news organization that published the September 23rd News Article.

In or about late October 2016, however, after the Director of the FBI sent a letter to the U.S. Congress, which stated that the FBI had learned of new information that might be pertinent to an investigation that the FBI was conducting of Candidate# 2,[ Steele] told the FBI that he/she was frustrated with this action and believed it would likely influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. In response to[ Steele 's] concerns,[ Steele] independently, and against the prior admonishment from the FBI to speak only with the FBI on this matter, released the reporting discussed herein to an identified news organization. Although the FBI continues to assess[ that][ Steele 's] reporting is reliable, as noted above, the FBI has suspended its relationship with[ Steele] because of this disclosure.( Emphasis in original).

We found no evidence that the FBI" suspended'' its relationship with Steele; rather, FBI paperwork reflects that Steele was closed for cause as an FBI CHS in November 2016. However, as we describe in Chapters Six and Nine, as a practical matter, the FBI continued to collect information from Steele over a period of months through a conduit, Department attorney Bruce Ohr.

Additionally, as discussed in Chapter Five, contrary to FBI policy, the characterization of Steele 's prior reporting had not been approved by his handling agent, who told us that the characterization was inaccurate-according to the handling agent, only some of Steele 's prior reporting had been corroborated, most of it had not, and Steele 's information had never been used in a criminal proceeding. This inaccuracy was not corrected in Renewal Application No. 1 or in the subsequent renewal applications, even after a formal FBI human source validation review of Steele in March 2017 found that his past contributions to the FBI 's criminal program had been" minimally corroborated.'' Further, as described in Chapter Eight, the FBI did not reassess Steele 's reliability in the renewal applications, or advise 01, after the Crossfire Hurricane team obtained additional information that was highly relevant to the reliability of his election reporting. This included information received before Renewal Application No. 1 about Steele 's work-related performance in a prior position and before Renewal Application Nos. 2 and 3 from Steele 's Primary Sub-source that contradicted the source reporting in the FISA applications. In addition, as we also discuss in Chapter Eight, Renewal Application No. 1 and the subsequent renewal applications did not describe information that the FBI obtained from Department attorney Bruce Ohr regarding Steele 's possible motivations and bias.

Finally, the information in Renewal Application No. 1 regarding early CHS meetings remained unchanged from the prior application. The renewal application also did not include information about the August 2016 meeting between Carter Page and an FBI CHS or the September 2016 meetings between Papadopoulos and an FBI CHS, discussed in Chapters Five and Ten. It also did not include an accurate description of the October 2016 meeting between Page and an FBI CHS, also discussed in Chapters Five and Ten. In addition, as described in Chapters Eight and Ten, Renewal Application No. 1 and the subsequent renewal applications did not include information about an October 2016 CHS meeting involving an FBI CHS and Papadopoulos during which Papadopoulos said that he knew" for a fact'' that the Trump campaign was not involved in releasing emails from the DNC.

2. Review and Approval Process

As described previously, according to Department and FBI procedures, once an FBI case agent affirms the accuracy of the information in the proposed FISA application( read copy), an 01 Unit Chief or Deputy Unit Chief is usually the final and only approver before a read copy is submitted to the FISC. The Unit Chief or Deputy is also usually the final approver who" signs out'' the final application( cert copy) to the FBI for completion of the Woods Procedures and Director 's certification, before presentation to either the Assistant Attorney General( AAG) of NSD, the Deputy Attorney General( DAG), or the Attorney General for final signature. However, as reflected in Chapter Five, in some instances, FISA applications presenting novel issues or otherwise deemed to have heightened sensitivity will receive additional supervisory review within the FBI, the Department, or both. As described below, FISA Renewal Application No. 1 did not receive the same level of review in FBI OGC as the first Carter Page FISA application, but it did receive additional review within NSD and the Office of the Deputy Attorney General( ODAG).

a. Supervisory Review and Finalization of Read Copy

Unlike the first FISA application, then FBI General Counsel James Baker and then Deputy General Counsel, Trisha Anderson, did not review FISA Renewal Application No. 1 before the read copy was submitted to the court. Baker told us that he did not review any of the renewal applications. He said that, in general, if none of the relevant factual information had changed from the first application, and the foreign intelligence purpose for the FISA remained the same, he did not believe it was necessary to review renewal applications. In addition, he told us that in at least one instance, he did not know that the FBI was planning to seek a renewal on Carter Page until the application was already with the Director for certification. According to the OGC Unit Chief, OGC is usually less involved in renewal applications because they generally only require updates to the factual information already asserted in an initial FISA application. She said that the interactions on renewal applications mostly take place at the 01 attorney and case agent levels. McCabe told us that, as the Deputy Director, he did not approve requests before they were submitted to 01 for FISA application renewals, but he would have been briefed on the collections from the ongoing FISA surveillance. McCabe said that he understood that the first Carter Page FISA was" very productive'' and the team wanted to pursue a renewal.

Within NSD, Renewal Application No. 1 received additional supervisory review above the 01 Unit Chief. On December 28, after reviewing the draft, the 01 Unit Chief emailed the 01 Attorney to approve of the new information and assessments included in the draft. On December 29, the 01 Attorney emailed a draft of Renewal Application No. 1 to Stuart Evans, NSD 's then Deputy AAG for Intelligence, Gabriel Sanz-Rexach, the Chief of OI 's Operations Section, and OI 's Deputy Operations Section Chief for their review, advising them that the draft was" about 95 % complete'' and that an additional update would be added before the final draft was completed.

Sanz-Rexach told the OIG that he reviewed Renewal Application No. 1, but did not recall any specific comments he made. He said that he recalled that prior to the renewal, the FBI. He also said that the evidence collected during the first FISA application time period demonstrated that Carter Page had access to individuals in Russia and he was communicating with people in the Trump campaign, which created a concern that Russia could use their influence with Carter Page to effect policy. The Deputy Operations Section Chief told us that she reviewed the new factual information in the renewal application, but did not recall as many meetings or discussions about the renewals and did not recall making any comments on any of the renewal applications.

Emails reflect that Evans reviewed the draft renewal application and provided two minor edits, one of which added more detail concerning Carter Page 's December 2016 meeting with an FBI CHS. Evans told us that he focused his attention primarily on the footnote describing Steele 's Mother Jones disclosure that led to a change in Steele 's relationship with the FBI, and did not edit the footnote following his review.

On January 3, Evans emailed the read copy to NSD 's then Acting AAG Mary McCord for her review with a request to discuss a few points in the renewal. Although the emails did not specify the points for discussion, McCord told us she recalled a discussion with Evans about the information the FBI collected from the FISA coverage targeting Carter Page up to that point and whether it was sufficient to sustain a renewal. McCord told us she also wanted to make sure that the renewal application described the closure of Steele after his disclosures to the media, which was already included in the read copy she reviewed.

b. ODAG Review and Approval of Read Copy

Although not a required step in the FISA procedures, ODAG officials reviewed the read copy for Renewal Application No. 1 before it was submitted to the court. Similar to the first application, the renewal application was reviewed by Tashina Gauhar, the Associate Deputy Attorney General responsible for ODAG 's national security portfolio, an OI attorney on detail in ODAG, Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General( PADAG) Matthew Axelrod, and DAG Sally Yates, who ultimately approved and signed the final application.

On December 30, 2016, the OI Unit Chief emailed the read copy of Renewal Application No. 1 to Gauhar, and the OI attorney on detail advising that it was" 95 % complete'' with one question for ODAG to consider. Documents do not indicate that ODAG made any edits to the December 30 draft. The question for ODAG was whether to include an expansion to the particularized minimization procedures, or PMPs, restriction on who could access the FISA collections to include the agents and analysts investigating the ongoing perception management activities by Russia. The final renewal application included the expanded PMPs, restricting access to the FISA collection to only those individuals assigned to investigate Russia 's efforts to influence the 2016 U.S. elections and Russia 's attempts at perception management and influence activities against the U.S.

On January 4, the 01 attorney on detail in ODAG advised 01 that the 01 attorney had provided" a couple of suggestions... which we did not think( and hopefully are not) significant'' and advised that Axelrod would want to review the read copy. We did not find documentation showing the suggestions ODAG recommended for the draft. According to Gauhar, ODAG did not make significant edits or have many questions after it reviewed Renewal Application No. 1. Gauhar also told us that she believed the first renewal was significant because it demonstrated that, despite the questions about whether to seek a Carter Page FISA prior to the first application, the surveillance yielded relevant and useful information. Gauhar said she recalled that the FISA collection included, among other things.

As with the first FISA application, NSD decided that although it was not a required step, it would not submit the read copy to the FISC until Yates had personally read it and said she was comfortable moving forward. According to Gauhar, Yates and Axelrod reviewed Renewal Application No. 1, and following Yates 's review, 01 submitted the read copy to the FISC. Yates and Axelrod told us that they did not have a specific recollection of reviewing Renewal Application No. 1 but said they may have done so.

3. Feedback from the FISC, Completion of the Final Renewal Application and Woods Procedures, and Final Legal Review

On January 10, 2017, the OI Attorney advised Evans and OI management that the FISC judge reviewed the renewal application, had" no issue'' with the application, and would sign the application without an appearance. The day before, the OI Unit Chief" signed out'' the cert copy of the application and cert memo to the FBI, so that the FBI could complete the Woods procedures( previously described in Chapters Two and Five). Case Agent 1 was the agent responsible for compiling the supporting documentation into the Woods File and performing the field office database checks on Carter Page and the accuracy review of each fact asserted in the FISA application. His new supervisor at FBI Headquarters for the Carter Page investigation, SSA 3, was responsible for confirming that the Woods File was complete and double checking the factual accuracy review to confirm that the file contained appropriate documentation for the factual assertions in the FISA application.

As noted previously, in the case of renewal applications, the FISA Standard Minimization Procedures Policy Guide( FISA SMP PG) requires that a case agent reverify the accuracy of each factual assertion from an initial application that is repeated in a renewal application and verify and obtain supporting documentation for any new factual assertions that are added to a renewal application. Case Agent 1 did not recall whether he reviewed every factual assertion or just the newly added information when he conducted the accuracy review for Renewal Application No. 1. Case Agent 1 told us that his general practice on a renewal application is not to necessarily review the factual information carried over from the prior application. He said that if the factual information does not materially change from the prior FISA application, he will review just the newly added information. According to Case Agent 6, Case Agent 1 told him that when he( Case Agent 1) performed the factual accuracy review on Renewal Application No. 1, he only reviewed the new factual assertions in the application, not the factual assertions that carried over from the prior application. At the time Case Agent 1 conducted the accuracy review of Renewal Application No. 1, he had been transferred back to the New York Field Office( NYFO) and was conducting the Carter Page investigation from that office. After he completed his review, he faxed the signed FISA Verification Form( Woods Form) to SSA 3 at FBI Headquarters.

SSA 3 reviewed the Woods File at Headquarters, signed the Woods Form on January 10, affirming the verification and documentation of each factual assertion in the application, and then sent the FISA application package containing the Woods Form, cert copy, and a cover memorandum( cert memo) to the Headquarters Program Manager assigned the responsibility, as the affiant, of signing the final application under oath that the factual information was true and correct. SSA 3 told us that when he signed the Woods Form, he was verifying that every fact contained in Renewal Application No. 1 had a supporting document confirming the accuracy of the statement. However, like Case Agent 1, SSA 3 also told us that, when he performs a Woods review, he does not re-verify the factual assertions carried over from previous applications, but only checks the new information, which is noted in bold font.

The Headquarters Program Manager assigned as the affiant was SSA 2, who was assigned to the Crossfire Hurricane investigation in late December 2016. He told us he received the renewal package from the 01 Attorney and reviewed the first FISA application and the newly added information to Renewal Application No. 1. SSA 2 told us that he did not recall reviewing the Woods Form, but that it was his practice at the time to do so before signing a FISA application( as described in Chapter Two, the Woods Procedures do not require the affiant to review the Woods File, only the case agent and his or her supervisor). SSA 2 said that he believed everything in the application to be true and correct based on the Woods Verification completed by Case Agent 1 and SSA 3. SSA 2 told us that he identified no issues or questions after reviewing Renewal Application No. 1 and signed the affidavit affirming under penalty of perjury that the information in the package was true and correct. He then submitted the FISA application package to either the OGC Attorney or the OGC Unit Chief for final legal review.

As described in Chapter Two, after the affiant signs the affidavit, the application package is submitted to the FBI 's National Security and Cyber Law Branch( NSCLB) for final legal review and approval by both a line attorney and Senior Executive Service-level supervisor. Once they approve the application, the line attorney and supervisor sign the cert memo. The OGC Attorney told the OIG that he did not recall reviewing any prior drafts of the application before he received the cert copy on January 10. He said that when he received the cert copy, he focused his legal review on the newly added material. We were advised that the FBI and NSD were unable to locate a fully signed copy of the cert memo that accompanied Renewal Application No. 1, and we were unable to independently determine who reviewed the FISA application package on behalf of OGC 's NSCLB. Instant messages suggest that the OGC Attorney performed the line attorney review for NSCLB and submitted the package to Anderson for her review and signature.

4. FBI Director 's Certification

Comey reviewed and certified the Carter Page FISA Renewal Application No. 1 on behalf of the FBI on January 12. Chapter Two describes the elements of the certification required by the Director or Deputy Director, including that the information sought through the requested FISA authority is foreign intelligence information that can not reasonably be obtained by normal investigative techniques and is necessary to protect the United States against clandestine intelligence activities. Comey told the OIG that he had no specific memory of reviewing or signing any of the Carter Page FISA renewal application packages. As we discussed in Chapter Five, Comey recalled reading the first Carter Page application before he certified it and being satisfied that the application seemed factually and legally sufficient when he read it, and he had no questions or concerns before he signed.

5. DAG Oral Briefing and Approval

Yates did not specifically recall the oral briefing on Renewal Application No. 1. Ol 's Deputy Operations Section Chief conducted the briefing and told the OIG that she did not recall anyone having any questions about Renewal Application No. 1. Yates told the OIG she did not recall if she read the entire renewal or just the additions and changes.

Yates told us that she did not have any concerns with the FBI seeking renewal authorization for the Carter Page FISA, although she wanted to make sure that the representation to the FISC was that the focus remained on Carter Page. Yates also told us that she had been briefed by McCabe prior to reviewing Renewal Application No. 1 on Steele 's closure due to his disclosure to the media, and was aware that information would be included in the renewal. Yates said it was a brief discussion and she did not recall if McCabe told her whether there was an additional reason the FBI closed Steele or anything further about Steele. On January 12, Yates signed the application, and the application was submitted to the FISC the same day. By her signature, and as stated in the application, Yates found that the application satisfied the criteria and requirements of the FISA statute and approved its filing with the court. 6. Final Orders

The final FISA application included proposed orders, which were signed by FISC Judge Michael W. Mosman, on January 12, 2017. According to NSD, the judge signed the final orders, as proposed by the government in their entirety, without holding a hearing.

The primary order and warrant stated that the court found, based upon the facts submitted in the verified application, that there was probable cause to believe that Russia is a foreign power and that Carter Page was an agent of Russia under SO U.S.C. ยง 1801 b 2( E). The court also found that the court authorized the requested electronic surveillance days and necessary to effectuate the electronic surveillance court authorized.
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