Story Analyzer - Horowitz Report Ch8 II A and B

Narrative

II. Other Inaccurate, Incomplete, or Undocumented Information in the Three FISA Renewal Applications

In addition to the issues raised in the July 2018 Rule 13 Letter to the FISC, our review revealed other instances in which the three Carter Page renewal applications were inaccurate, incomplete, or unsupported by appropriate documentation, based upon information in the FBI 's possession at the time the applications were filed. We describe the more significant instances below and identify other instances in Appendix One.

A. Inconsistencies between Steele 's Reporting and Information His Primary Sub-source Provided to the FBI

As described previously, all four Carter Page FISA applications relied upon the following aspects of Steele 's reporting to support the government 's position that there was probable cause to believe that Carter Page was an agent of a foreign power:

• From Report 80: Derogatory information about Hillary Clinton had been compiled for many years, was controlled by the Kremlin, and the Kremlin had been feeding information to the Trump campaign for an extended period of time;

• From Report 94: During his July 2016 trip to Moscow, Carter Page attended a secret meeting with Igor Sechin, Chairman of Rosneft and a close associate of Putin, and discussed future cooperation and the lifting of Ukraine-related sanctions against Russia; and a separate meeting Page attended with Igor Divyekin, a highly-placed Russian government official, and discussed derogatory information about Clinton with the Trump campaign;

• From Report 95: Carter Page was an intermediary between Russia and the Trump campaign in a" well-developed conspiracy of cooperation,'' managed by Trump 's then campaign manager, Paul Manafort, using Page as an intermediary, which led to Russia 's disclosure of hacked DNC emails to WikiLeaks in exchange for the Trump team 's agreement, to include at least Page, to sideline Russian intervention in Ukraine as a campaign issue; and

• From Report 102: Russia released the DNC emails to WikiLeaks in an attempt to swing voters to Trump, an objective conceived of and promoted by Page and others.

All four FISA applications clearly stated that Steele did not obtain the information described above directly from his source network. Instead, as described in the FISA applications, Steele received the information from a Primary Sub-source who obtained the information from his/her own source network.

In Chapter Six, we described the FBI 's interview of the Primary Sub-source in January 2017, after FISA Renewal Application No. 1 was filed but before the last two renewal applications were filed. After the interview, the Supervisory Intel Analyst and Case Agent 1 memorialized the information in a lengthy written summary. As described in Chapter Six, the Primary Sub-source confirmed for the FBI that he/she provided Steele with some of the information in Steele 's reports. However, in some instances, the information the Primary Sub-source told the FBI about what his/her sources told him/her-- and what he/she then provided to Steele-was inconsistent with information attributed to his/her sources in Steele 's reporting. Of particular relevance to the FISA applications, we found that the Primary Sub-source 's account to the FBI( based on the written interview summary) differed from Steele 's reporting on the following points:

• With respect to the information from Reports 95 and 102 that the FBI assessed had come from Person 1( described in prior chapters) concerning the alleged" conspiracy'' between Russia and individuals associated with the Trump campaign, and Russia 's release of DNC emails to WikiLeaks in an attempt to swing voters to Trump: the Primary Sub-source said, among other things, that he/she did not recall any discussion with Person 1 concerning WikiLeaks and that there was" nothing bad'' about the communications between the Kremlin and the Trump team;

• With respect to the alleged secret meeting between Carter Page and Sechin in July 2016: the Primary Sub-source said he/she was not told by his/her sub-source that this meeting had taken place until October 2016, well after Steele prepared and circulated Report 94, and that he/she only told Steele in July 2016 that he/she had heard that the meeting would be taking place; and

• With respect to the positions and access of the sub-sources: the Primary Sub-source 's description of each of his/her sources indicated that their position and access to the information they were reporting was more attenuated than represented by Steele and described in the FISA applications.[ REDACTED]

Regarding the information in the first bullet above, in early October 2016, the FBI learned the true name of Person 1( described in Report 95 as" Source E''). As described in Chapter Six, the Primary Sub-source told the FBI that he/she had one 10- to 15-minute telephone call with someone he/she believed to be Person 1, but who did not identify him/herself on the call. We found that, during his/her interview with the FBI, the Primary Sub-source did not describe a" conspiracy'' between Russia and individuals associated with the Trump campaign or state that Carter Page served as an" intermediary'' between Manafort and the Russian government. In addition, the FBl 's summary of the Primary Sub-source 's interview did not describe any discussions between the parties concerning the disclosure of DNC emails to WikiLeaks in exchange for a campaign platform change on the Ukrainian issue. To the contrary, according to the interview summary, the Primary Sub-source told the FBI that Person 1 told him/her that there was" nothing bad'' about the communications between the Kremlin and Trump, and that he/she did not recall any mention of WikiLeaks. Further, although Steele informed the FBI that he had received all of the information in Report 95 from the Primary Sub-source, and Steele told the OIG the same thing when we interviewed him, the Primary Sub- source told the FBI that he/she did not know where some of the information attributed to Source E in Report 95 came from.

Despite the inconsistencies between Steele 's reporting and the information his Primary Sub-source provided to the FBI, the subsequent FISA renewal applications continued to rely on the Steele information, without any revisions or notice to the court that the Primary Sub-source had contradicted the Steele reporting on key issues described in the renewal applications. Instead, as described previously, FISA Renewal Application Nos. 2 and 3 advised the court:

In an effort to further corroborate[ Steele 's] reporting, the FBI has met with[ Steele 's][ REDACTED] sub-source[ Primary Sub-source] described immediately above. During these interviews, the FBI found the[ REDACTED] sub-source to be truthful and cooperative.[ REDACTED] The FBI is undertaking additional investigative steps to further corroborate the information provide[ sic] by[ Steele] and[ REDACTED]

NSD cited this language from the renewal applications in its July 2018 Rule 13 Letter as an example of information" corroborating'' Steele 's reporting, noting that" the FBI met with[ Steele 's][ Primary] sub-source, whom the FBI found to be truthful and cooperative.'' Evans and the OI officials who participated in the preparation of the renewal applications and Rule 13 Letter told us that they were not advised of the inconsistences between Steele 's reporting and the Primary Sub-source 's interview, and that they did not believe that the FBI provided them with the lengthy written summary of the interview. We did not find any evidence indicating otherwise.

We found no evidence that the Crossfire Hurricane team ever considered whether any of the inconsistencies warranted reconsideration of the FBI 's previous assessment of the reliability of the Steele reports or notice to OI or the court in the subsequent renewal applications. As described below, team members told us that they either were not aware of the inconsistences or, if they were, did not make the connection that the inconsistencies affected aspects of the FISA applications.

Case Agent 1, who led the January 2017 interview of the Primary Sub-source, was closely familiar with the Carter Page FISA applications because, as described previously, he originally requested FISA authority targeting Carter Page and assisted OI with drafting the first two FISA applications. In addition, after the Carter Page investigation was reassigned to Case Agent 6 in early 2017, Case Agent 1 assisted Case Agent 6 with the completion of the Woods Procedures for Renewal Application No. 2 by performing the factual accuracy review. The Woods File used during that review contained the interview summary of the Primary Sub-source. Case Agent 1 told us that he could not explain why changes had not been made to the renewal applications to account for the inconsistencies between the Primary Sub-source and Steele on facts asserted in the applications. Case Agent 1 said that although he thought the Primary Sub-source may have been minimizing the extent of his/her interactions with Person 1, it did not occur to Case Agent 1 at the time that the information from the Primary Sub-source contradicted information in the FISA applications. In particular, Case Agent 1 said that he did not know enough about some of the details concerning Person 1 to necessarily understand that the Primary Sub-source 's account potentially conflicted with information in the FISA applications. For example, he said he did not know whether Steele had his own relationship with Person 1 such that Steele could have had another basis for attributing all the information in Report 95 to Person 1. Case Agent 1 added that he believed that someone else should have highlighted the issue for the agents working on the FISA application.

Case Agent 6 told us that he read the written summary of the Primary Sub-source 's January 2017 interview before he assisted the OI Attorney with FISA Renewal Application No. 2, and Case Agent 6 's written contributions to the draft application contain two references to information the FBI learned during the interview. However, Case Agent 6 did not identify for OI inconsistences between the Primary Sub-source and Steele on the facts asserted in the FISA application. Case Agent 6 did not participate in the Primary Sub-source 's interview, which took place before he took over the Carter Page case from Case Agent 1. Case Agent 6 told us that he read the written summary of the interview after he took over and realized that he did not yet understand all the details of the case. He said that for this reason, he asked Case Agent 1 to assist him with the Woods Procedures for Renewal Application No. 2. Case Agent 6 told us that he did not recall Case Agent 1 or Supervisory Intel Analyst advising him during the Woods process of the inconsistencies.

Analytical documents prepared by, or with the assistance of, the Supervisory Intel Analyst after the Primary Sub-source interview identified inconsistences between Steele and the Primary Sub-source regarding some of the information contained in Reports 94 and 95. The Supervisory Intel Analyst told us that, after the January 2017 interview, his impression was that the Primary Sub-source 's account did not line up completely with Steele 's reporting, but the Supervisory Intel Analyst said he did not have any" pains or heartburn'' about the accuracy of the Steele reporting based on what the Primary Sub-source had said. The Supervisory Intel Analyst said that his thinking at the time was focused instead on using the additional information learned from the Primary Sub-source, particularly the identity of his/her sub-sources, to see what other investigative leads could be generated for the team.

The Supervisory Intel Analyst told us that he played a supportive role for the agents preparing the FISA applications, including reading the probable cause section of the first application and providing the agents with some of the information on the identity of the sub-sources noted in the application. He said that he had some interaction with the agents preparing the renewal applications, but he believed those interactions were less extensive than his involvement in the first application. The Supervisory Intel Analyst did not recall anyone asking him whether he thought the Primary Sub-source was" truthful and cooperative,'' as noted in the renewal applications. He told us it was his impression that the Primary Sub-source may not have been" completely truthful'' and may have been minimizing certain aspects of what he/she told Steele. However, the Supervisory Intel Analyst told the OIG that, on the whole, he did not see any reason to doubt the information the Primary Sub-source provided about who he/she received his/her information from, which was the Supervisory Intel Analyst 's focus.

SSA 5, who performed the supervisory factual accuracy review during the Woods Procedures for Renewal Application Nos. 2 and 3, told us that he did not recall whether he was briefed on the Primary Sub-source 's interview, and he did not appear during his OIG interview to know anything about the Primary Sub-source. Similarly, Case Agent 7, who performed the Woods Procedures for Renewal Application No. 3, told us that he did not know, or have the case knowledge necessary to determine, that the Primary Sub-source provided information inconsistent with facts asserted in the FISA application.

Program managers supervising the investigation from FBI Headquarters-- SSA 2 and SSA 3-- were aware of the Primary Sub-source 's interview and had read the written summary of it. However, we found no evidence that either of them identified issues with or raised any questions about how the Primary Sub-source 's interview may have impacted the information in the FISA applications. As described previously, SSA 3 did not play a direct role in Renewal Application No. 2, but he was familiar with the prior FISA applications, having performed the supervisory factual accuracy review during the Woods Procedures for Renewal Application No. 1. SSA 3 told us that he did not recall noticing any information from the Primary Sub-source 's interview that was inconsistent with information in the FISA application. SSA 2 was the affiant who declared, based on the completion of the Woods Procedures, that the information in Renewal Application Nos. 2 and 3 was true and correct. He told us that he did not recall any discussion about whether the Primary Sub-source 's interview warranted revisions to the FISA applications, but said he had some recollection that the investigators believed at the time that the Primary Sub-source was holding something back about his/her interaction with Person 1.

The OGC Unit Chief and the OGC Attorney told us that they did not review or receive the written summary of the Primary Sub-source 's January 2017 interview at any time before Renewal Application No. 2 was submitted to the court. However, they said that they knew the interview had taken place and had the general understanding from the team that the information provided to the FBI by the Primary Sub-source" essentially echoed,''" was consistent with,'' or" corroborated'' the information in Steele 's reporting. The OGC Unit Chief said that her understanding was that the Primary Sub-source raised some questions about how Steele wrote his reports or the wording Steele used, and that the agents and analysts had looked into it but did not think the wording choices were substantively different. The OGC Attorney said that he had some vague recollection that the team thought Steele may have conflated some of his sourcing on WikiLeaks based on information provided by the Primary Sub-source. However, they both said that they did not recall the details of these discussions.

Although documents provided to the OIG indicate that senior FBI officials were told about some aspects of the Primary Sub-source 's interview, the documents do not reflect that senior FBI officials were advised of the inconsistences. For example, in late February 2017, the Supervisory Intel Analyst circulated a 2-page Intelligence Memorandum to CD Assistant Director E.W.( Bill) Priestap and other CD officials highlighting aspects of the Primary Sub-source 's interview. In March 2017, Priestap forwarded the memorandum to Comey 's and McCabe 's offices. The memorandum stated that the Primary Sub-source told the FBI that Steele 's reporting contained" some of[ his/her] reporting, what appear to be[ his/her] analytical conclusions, and what[ he/she] believes to be[ Steele 's] analytical judgments.'' The memorandum provided some details concerning what the Primary Sub-source said about his/her own sources, but the memorandum did not describe the inconsistencies we noted earlier.

Senior CD officials overseeing the Crossfire Hurricane investigation-- including Priestap, Strzok, the Intel Section Chief, and CD DAD Jennifer Boone-- told us that they did not recall being advised that the information from the Primary Sub-source significantly differed from the information in Steele 's reporting. Boone told us that she recalled being told after the Primary Sub-source 's interview that the team assessed that Steele may have gotten some of his information from a source other than the Primary Sub-source. Boone said that she did not recall being advised that the interview created inconsistencies between Steele and his Primary Sub-source as to facts relied upon in the FISA applications. Boone further stated that she would have expected to have been told that information. Strzok told us that he did remember learning as a result of the Primary Sub-source interview that Steele did not receive his reporting directly from the sub-sources, but rather solely through the Primary Sub-source as the intermediary. Strzok said he recalled having a" little bit of concern'' about that. He later wrote to Comey 's Chief of Staff, Priestap, and others that''[ r] ecent interviews and investigation, however, reveal Steele may not be in a position to judge the reliability of his sub-source network.''

Comey told us that he did not know whether the team interviewed any of Steele 's sub-sources. Because Comey decided not to have his security clearance reinstated for his OIG interview, we were unable to question him further or refresh his recollection with relevant, classified documentation.

The NSD 's Counterintelligence and Export Control Section( CES) representatives who attended the Primary Sub-source 's January 2017 interview-- Section Chief David Laufman and his Deputy Section Chief-- told us that they did not recall discussing the interview with OI officials afterward. They told us that they did not have knowledge of the information in the Carter Page FISA applications at the time, and that they were not sufficiently familiar with the Steele reports to have understood that there were inconsistencies between the Primary Sub-source and Steele. We did not find any information to the contrary. They told us that they attended the interview because CES had helped negotiate the terms of the interview with the Primary Sub-source 's attorney, and, as noted previously, their role during the interview was primarily to address any issues or concerns raised by the attorney during the interview.

The OI Attorney told the OIG that if had he known about the inconsistencies between the Primary Sub-source and Steele on the facts asserted in the FISA applications, he would have wanted an opportunity to ask questions and gather more information. In particular, after we asked the OI Attorney to read the written summary of the Primary Sub-source 's interview regarding the telephone call with Person 1, the OI Attorney was surprised, agreed it was not consistent with the information in the FISA applications concerning Report 95, and said" it does n't seem like the same story.'' Evans told us that OI would have sought to determine how the new information impacted the FISA applications, including obtaining the FBI 's own assessment of how to reconcile the apparent inconsistencies. Evans said that at a minimum, OI would have advised the court of the inconsistencies and the FBI 's assessment of those inconsistences. He further stated that, depending on the information from the FBI, OI may have decided to delay or abandon the filing of the next renewal application altogether.

B. Information about Page 's Prior Relationship with Another U.S. Government Agency and Information Page Provided the Other Agency that Overlapped with Facts Asserted in the FISA Applications

As noted in Chapter Five, on or about August 17, 2016, while early FISA discussions were ongoing, the Crossfire Hurricane team received a memorandum( August 17 Memorandum) from another U.S. government agency relating to Page 's prior relationship with that agency, including that Page had been approved for operational contact from 2008 to 2013. The information also described Page 's prior interactions with Russian intelligence officers about which the agency was aware, including contacts Page had with a Russian intelligence officer( Intelligence Officer 1), which were among the historical connections to Russian intelligence officers that the FBI later relied upon in the first FISA application( and subsequent renewal applications) to help support probable cause. We found that, although this information was highly relevant to the FISA application, the Crossfire Hurricane team did not engage with the other agency regarding this information. In addition, in response to a question from the OI Attorney in September 2016 as to whether Carter Page had a current or prior relationship with the other agency, Case Agent 1 provided the OI Attorney with inaccurate information that failed to disclose the extent and nature of Page 's relationship with that agency. As a result, the first FISA application, and FISA Renewal Application Nos. 1 and 2, contained no information regarding Page 's relationship with the other U.S. government agency, and did not reveal that his relationship with the other agency overlapped in part with facts asserted in the application regarding Page 's ties to particular Russian intelligence officers.

Before Renewal Application No. 3 was submitted to the court, and following news reports about the Carter Page FISAs, Page conducted news interviews in April and May 2017 in which he publicly stated that he had assisted the USIC in the past. Thereafter, the FBI re-engaged with the other U.S. government agency about its prior relationship with Page. SSA 2, who had been the affiant for the first two renewals and would be the affiant for FISA Renewal Application No. 3, told the OIG that in June 2017 he wanted a definitive answer as to whether Page had a prior relationship with the USIC before SSA 2 signed the last renewal application. SSA 2 also told us that he was concerned that Page could claim that he had been acting on behalf of the U.S. government in engaging with certain Russians. SSA 2 stated that he contacted the OGC Attorney assisting with the Crossfire Hurricane investigation to help resolve this issue. According to the OGC Attorney and SSA 2, the OGC Attorney was responsible for handling questions or concerns involving the other U.S. government agency for the Crossfire Hurricane team.

The OGC Attorney told us he recalled that the Supervisory Intel Analyst on the Crossfire Hurricane team had raised a concern that Page may have had a prior relationship with the other U.S. government agency in the past. The OGC Attorney said it was" a big, big concern from both OI and from the FBI that we had been targeting[ an individual with a prior relationship with the other agency], because that should never happen without us knowing about it.'' The OGC Attorney characterized the Crossfire Hurricane team as" spun up'' about this concern, and said he knew that if it were true, they would" need to provide that to the court'' because such information would" drastically change[] the way that we would handle...[ the] FISA application.'' SSA 2 told the OIG that this issue was very important to resolve, because if Page

was being tasked by another agency, especially if he was being tasked to engage Russians, then it would absolutely be relevant for the Court to know...[ and] could also seriously impact the predication of our entire investigation which focused on[ Page 's] close and continuous contact with Russian/Russia-linked individuals.

In mid-June 2017, the OGC Attorney contacted the other U.S. government agency to seek additional information about Page 's prior relationship with that other agency, and then communicated back to the OI Attorney and SSA 2. Because we determined that the OGC Attorney did not accurately convey, and in fact altered, the information he received from the other agency, we provide these communications in detail below. 1. June 15, 2017-FBI OGC Attorney Requests Information about Page from Other U.S. Government Agency

On June 15, 2017, the OGC Attorney emailed the liaison for the other U.S. government agency( Liaison) about Carter Page 's past, stating:

We need some clarification on Carter Page. There is an indication that he may be a''[ digraph]'' source. This is a fact we would need to disclose in our next FISA renewal( we would not name the[ U.S. government agency] of course).

To that end, can we get two items from you?

1) Source Check/Is Page a source in any capacity?

2) If he is, what is a''[ digraph]'' source( or whatever type of source he

is)?

If you would like to discuss more, please let me know.

The Liaison responded that same day by providing the OGC Attorney with a list of documents previously provided by the other agency to the FBI mentioning Page 's name, including the August 17 Memorandum. The Liaison also wrote that the U.S. government agency uses

the[ digraph] to show that the encrypted individual... is a[ U.S. person]. We encrypt the[ U.S. persons] when they provide reporting to us. My recollection is that Page was or is...[ digraph] but the[ documents] will explain the details. If you need a formal definition for the FISA, please let me know and we 'll work up some language and get it cleared for use.

The OGC Attorney responded," Thanks so much for this information. We 're digging into the[ documents] now, but I think the definition of the[ digraph] answers our questions.'' That same day, the OGC Attorney forwarded the Liaison 's email response to Case Agent 6 and an FBI SSA assigned to the Special Counsel 's Office, without adding any explanation or comment. The SSA responded by telling Case Agent 6 that she would" pull these[ documents] for you tomorrow and get you what you need.'' The OGC Attorney also sent an instant message to his supervisor, the OGC Unit Chief, stating that Carter Page was a" U.S. subsource of a source'' and that''[ digraph] = encrypted USPER.''

We asked the OGC Attorney if he read the documents identified by the Liaison in her June 15, 2017 email. The OGC Attorney told the OIG that he" did n't know the details of... the content of the[ documents]'' and did not think he was involved in reviewing them. He also said he" did n't have access to the[ documents] in the OGC space,'' but that the investigative team was provided the list of documents and that they would have been reviewing them. The OGC Attorney said he understood the Liaison 's response to mean that Page had not been a source-- which the OGC Attorney described as a" recruited asset''-- but rather someone who had some interaction with a source for the other U.S. government agency, and not a direct relationship with the other agency. He stated his understanding was that the other U.S. government agency

identified that[ Page] was[" digraph''], and[" digraph''] refers to a U.S. person... who 's incidentally picked up...[ in] reporting out from a source of theirs. So their recruited asset is at a meeting, and[ Page] happened to be there too. And then, in the reporting, the source mentions[ Page] is there, so the agency protects[ Page 's] true name by using...[" digraph'' for Page].

The OGC Attorney told us that-- his belief that Page had never been a source for the other U.S. government agency, but instead interacted with a source-- was based on telephone conversations with the Liaison. He said he recalled the Liaison" saying that[ Page] was not a source of theirs,'' but rather" incidentally reporting information via a source of theirs'' and that they" ended up not actually opening him.''

When we asked the Liaison about the OGC Attorney 's interpretation of the Liaison 's email, the Liaison told us that her email stated just the opposite, namely that Page was a U.S. person who had provided direct reporting to the other U.S. government agency in the past. The Liaison also said that the reason she offered, in her email, to assist in providing language for the FISA application was because she was telling the OGC Attorney that, using the FBI 's terminology, Page had been a source for the other agency. The Liaison also stated that she saw no basis for the OGC Attorney to have concluded, based on their communications and the August 17 Memorandum, that Page never had a direct relationship with the other agency.

The Liaison also said that she did not recall having any telephone discussions with the OGC Attorney on this issue. She added that, even if she had, she did not think the OGC Attorney would have been able to draw any conclusions from such a conversation. The Liaison explained that she would not have had the documents in front of her at the time of any such conversation, and therefore would not have given the OGC Attorney a definitive answer. She emphasized the need to read the documents in order to accurately understand the relationship between Page and the other U.S. government agency. 2. June 16, 2017-FBI OGC Attorney Provides the Liaison 's Response to the OI Attorney

On the evening of June 15, 2017, the OGC Attorney contacted the OI Attorney to request a time to talk the next day. FBI telephone records confirm they spoke the next morning for approximately 28 minutes, until 11:46 a.m. Also at 11:46 a.m. on June 16, the OGC Attorney forwarded to the OI Attorney the Liaison 's June 15 email response. However, in forwarding the Liaison 's response to the or Attorney, the OGC Attorney did not include the initial email that he sent to the Liaison inquiring about Page 's status as a''[ digraph] source.'' The OGC Attorney told us that he could not recall why he did not include the initial email, in which he asked," Is Page a source in any capacity? ''

The OI Attorney responded to the OGC Attorney 's email," thanks I think we are good and no need to carry it any further.'' The OGC Attorney replied," Music to my ears.''

The OI Attorney told us that he did not recall this email exchange with the OGC Attorney or the telephone call on June 16 with the OGC Attorney indicated in FBI telephone records. When we asked the OI Attorney whether he reviewed the August 17 Memorandum, he said he did not recall if he had asked to see it, but also stated that he would have relied on the case agent 's assessment of that document.

The OGC Attorney initially told us that he recalled providing a detailed briefing to the OI Attorney about Page 's status, and telling him that the OGC Attorney had conferred with the Liaison and that Page had not been a source for the other agency. However, in a subsequent OIG interview months later, the OGC Attorney said he did not recall a specific conversation with the OI Attorney on this subject matter, but thought he would have conveyed to the OI Attorney the details of what the Liaison had told him. 3. June 19, 2017-- FBI OGC Attorney Provides SSA 2 with Inaccurate Information

a. June 19, 2017 Instant Message Exchange

On June 19, 2017, the OGC Attorney and SSA 2 exchanged instant messages about Carter Page 's past relationship with the other agency. As described above, SSA 2 would be the affiant on Renewal Application No. 3 and was seeking a definitive answer as to whether Page had a prior relationship with the other agency. The relevant portions of the instant message exchange were as follows:

15:26:35, SSA 2:" Do we have any update on the[ agency] CHS request? Also,[ Case Agent 6] said[ 01 Attorney] is not so optimistic.''

15:27:53, OGC Attorney:''[ agency] CHS: You are referring to[ Carter Page]? ''

15:28:01, SSA 2:" Yes.''

15:28:05, OGC Attorney:" He is cleared.''

15:28:15, SSA 2:" Cleared to fly? ''

15:28:16, OGC Attorney:''[ digraph] = Masked USPER.''

15:28:34, SSA 2:" So he was and the relationship officially ended? ''

15:28:37, OGC Attorney:" So, essentially, the real... source was using[ Carter Page] as a[ Steele]- like subsource.''

15:28:47, OGC Attorney:''[ Carter Page] was never a source.''

15:28:59, SSA 2:" You mean the[ agency] officer? ''

15:29:19, OGC Attorney:" Right. Whomever generated the reporting from the[ documents].''

15:29:45, OGC Attorney:" It was just liaison with[ Carter Page] which resulted in reporting, eventually they closed it out as unhelpful.''

15:30:39, OGC Attorney:" So, in discussing with[ 01 Attorney], he agreed we do not need to address it in the FISA.''

15:31:16, OGC Attorney:''[ 01 Attorney] is always Eeyore in drafting these special FISA applications.''

15:31:27, SSA 2:" So[ Carter Page] was a[ digraph] or[ Carter Page] was a subsource of the[ digraph].''

15:32:00, OGC Attorney:" It 's[ sic] sounds like a subsource of the[ digraph].''

15:32:31, OGC Attorney:" And yes,[ the other agency] confirmed explicitly he was never a source.''

15:33:05, SSA 2:" Interesting.''

15:33:21, OGC Attorney:" But like, interesting good, right? ''

15: 33: 54, OGC Attorney:" I mean, at least we do n't have to have a terrible footnote.''

15:33:57, SSA 2:" Sure. Just interesting they say not a source. We thought otherwise based on the writing... I will re-read.''

15:34:28, OGC Attorney:" At most, it 's[ the Supervisory Intel Analyst] being the CHS, and you talking to[ the Supervisory Intel Analyst].''

15:34:54, SSA 2:" Got it. Thank you. Do we have that in writing.''

15: 35: 19, OGC Attorney:" On TS. I 'll forward/''

We asked the OGC Attorney about this instant message exchange with SSA 2 in which he told SSA 2 that Carter Page was never a source. The OGC Attorney stated," That was my, the impression that I was given, yes.'' We also asked why he told SSA 2 in the instant message exchange that the other U.S. government agency" confirmed explicitly that he was never a source.'' The OGC Attorney explained that his statement was just" shorthand'' for the information provided by the other agency about Page and that he had no particular reason to use the word" explicitly.'' As to his comment about a" terrible footnote'' in the instant messages, the OGC Attorney told us that he was referring to how" laborious'' it would be to draft such a footnote for the FISA application, not that such a footnote might undermine or conflict with the overall narrative presented in the FISA applications.

SSA 2 told us that the most important part of this interaction with the OGC Attorney was when the OGC Attorney told SSA 2 that the other agency had said" explicitly'' that Page had never been a source. SSA 2 characterized that statement as" the confirmation that I need[ ed].'' SSA 2 also said that he understood the OGC Attorney 's comment about not having to draft a" terrible footnote'' to mean that the team could avoid having to explain in Renewal Application No. 3 that they had" just now come to determine that[ Page] was an asset of the[ other agency] and probably being tasked to engage...[ with] Russians which is... why we opened a case on him.'' SSA 2 said that he understood the OGC Attorney to be saying that" the optic... would be terrible'' if the prior FISA applications were" dubious'' in light of a relationship between Page and the other agency, and the FBI was only becoming aware of that relationship in the third renewal application and after Page 's public statements.

We showed the instant message exchange between the OGC Attorney and SSA 2 to the Liaison and the OI Attorney. Neither had previously been aware of this exchange. The OI Attorney told us that the OGC Attorney 's description of Page as a sub-source did not sound familiar to him. He said:

I feel like if the[ OGC Attorney] would have said, well he was a sub-source, I mean to me that 's like a flag...[ T] hat means he was being handled by somebody. That means that there was... something more; let 's dig more into it.

The OI Attorney also focused on the portion of the exchange where SSA 2 expressed a belief that Page was a source and where the OGC Attorney mentioned not having to prepare a" terrible footnote.'' He told us that OI should have been made aware of any" internal debate'' within the FBI about whether Page was a source for another U.S. government agency, because with the FISC there is no" defense counsel on the other side,'' and it is up to OI" to over tell the story.''

The Liaison focused on the portion of the exchange in which the OGC Attorney stated that Page" was never a source.'' The Liaison told us that this statement was wrong, as was the OGC Attorney 's statement that Page" was a U.S. sub-source of a source.'' The Liaison said that such an assertion is" directly contradictory to the[ documents]'' the agency provided to the FBI. The Liaison also said it was inaccurate to describe Carter Page as" like a sub-source of[ a digraph]'' and to state that the other agency had" confirmed explicitly that[ Page] was never a source.'' We asked the Liaison whether the Liaison ever told the OGC Attorney that Page was not a source. The Liaison said that, to the best of the Liaison 's recollection, the Liaison did not and would not have characterized the status of a''[ digraph]'' without either first reaching out to the other agency 's experts responsible for the underlying reporting, or relying on the proper supporting documentation for an answer. The Liaison stated," I have no recollection of there being any basis for[ the OGC Attorney] to reach that conclusion, and it is directly contradicted by the documents.''

b. The OGC Attorney Sends SSA 2 an Altered Version of the Liaison 's June 15 Email

Immediately following the June 19 instant message exchange between the OGC Attorney and SSA 2, SSA 2 received an email from the OGC Attorney that appeared to be forwarding the Liaison 's June 15 response email concerning Page 's historical contact with the other U.S. government agency. However, the OIG determined that this forwarded version of the Liaison 's response email had been altered. Specifically, the words" and not a` source ''' had been inserted in the Liaison 's June 15 response after the word''[ digraph].'' Thus, the Liaison 's email was altered to read:" My recollection is that Page was or is and[ sic]'[ digraph]' and not a` source' but the[ documents] will explain the details.''( Emphasis added). The OGC Attorney also did not include in the email sent to SSA 2 the initial email inquiry from the OGC Attorney to the Liaison about Page 's status as a''[ digraph] source.''

In response to the June 19 email, SSA 2 asked the OGC Attorney if SSA 2 could send the email to the FBI agents working on the matter. The OGC Attorney responded:" Yes. I actually already did on Friday when[ the OI Attorney] said we 're good to go. Sorry for not cc` ing you.''

We asked the OGC Attorney about the alteration in the email he sent to SSA 2. He initially stated that he was not certain how the alteration occurred, but subsequently acknowledged that he made the change. He also stated it was consistent with his impression of the information that he had been provided by the Liaison.

We discussed the altered email with SSA 2, who told us that the OGC Attorney was the person he relied upon to resolve the issue of whether Carter Page was or had been a source for the other U.S. government agency. SSA 2 told us that the statement inserted into the Liaison 's email-- that Page was" not a source''-- was the most important part of the email for him. SSA 2 said" if they say[ he 's] not a source, then you know we 're good.'' SSA 2 also said that if the email from the Liaison had not contained the words" not a source'' then, for him, the issue would have remained unresolved, and he would have had to seek further clarification. SSA 2 stated:" If you take out` and not a source,' it 's not wrong, but it does n't really answer the question.'' He also said that something lesser, such as a verbal statement from the Liaison through the OGC Attorney, would not have resolved the issue for him. SSA 2 also told us it was important to him that the OGC Attorney had first sent the Liaison 's response email to the OI Attorney, because if they discussed the issue and they have" decided we do n't have to do a footnote that he 's not a source... we 've resolved this. We 're good to move forward.'' He also said that he" would assume that the[ OI Attorney]... received exactly what[ SSA 2] received since it was a forward.''

We also showed the altered June 19, 2017 email to the Liaison. She told us that the combination of the omission of the OGC Attorney 's question to the Liaison about Page 's status as a''[ digraph] source,'' along with the addition of the words" not a` source''' to her response, was misleading. She explained that by omitting how the OGC Attorney phrased his questions to her, it took away the context necessary to fully understand her response. We also asked the Liaison whether" not a` source''' is language she would use to describe a''[ digraph].'' She said she would not have included the" not a` source''' language in an email to the OGC Attorney because the Liaison 's agency does" not call them sources.'' The Liaison added that the phrase" not a` source''' is contradictory to the term''[ digraph],'' because''[ digraph]'' indicates that the person is providing information to the Liaison 's agency.

Consistent with the Inspector General Act of 1978, following the OIG 's discovery that the OGC Attorney had altered the email that he sent to SSA 2, who thereafter relied on it to swear out the final FISA application, the OIG promptly informed the Attorney General and the FBI Director, and provided them with the relevant information about the OGC Attorney 's actions.

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Horowitz Report Chapter 8 Section II

Other Inaccurate, Incomplete, or Undocumented Information in the Three FISA Renewal Applications (A and B)

see https://www.justice.gov/storage/120919-examination.pdf

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